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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether Internet telephony has 
had a negative impact on a country’s telecommunications infrastructure. Using panel 
data the statistical analysis shows that call-back did not have a negative effect on 
infrastructure and high income countries benefited from that technology. Internet 
telephony shows a negative impact in high and lower middle income countries but at 
such a small scale that governments should not be concerned. Additionally the year 
variables show that for all income levels infrastructure has increased which means 
that if this technology will show any negative effects it will be in a gradual manner 
and should give carriers enough time to adjust their practices. 
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Assessing the impact of Internet telephony on the deployment 
of telecommunications infrastructure 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to show the impact of Internet telephony on 
telecommunications infrastructure. It is based on an empirical investigation of panel 
data with approximately 180 nations over a period of four years. The focus is on 
Internet telephony because there are governments that have banned the provision of 
these services. There is some justification for their concerns and this is related to the 
low level of telecommunications infrastructure that they currently have. While in 
developed countries on average there are 50 phone lines per 100 inhabitants, the 
average in developing countries is 10 (ITU, 2002). Infrastructure in developing 
countries thus lags substantially behind that of the developed world and requires 
further development to foster economic activity. In the absence of basic and 
affordable services, the emergence of the Internet has allowed people without access 
to household or mobile phones to make international calls at prices 30% to 50% 
cheaper through Internet cafés. Regulators in countries with low levels of 
infrastructure are concerned that permitting Internet telephony will destroy the 
telecommunications operators’ incentive for infrastructure investment. This is 
because in many less developed countries (LDCs) a large percentage of revenue is 
still generated from incoming and outgoing international calls, which subsidize local 
services. In the presence of such competition there is a fear that the carrier will not 
be able to cover its investment in the network and will thus have no desire to expand 
it. 
There are, nonetheless, studies (Lam, 1997; Frieden, 1998) that have argued 
that voice over the Internet (VOI) does not affect infrastructure because previous 
technologies such as call-back and international resale as well as political pressure 
from the United States and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have already 
reduced revenues from international traffic close to real costs. If this is the case, why 
are there still so many nations that prohibit the use of VOI? 
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Governments of developed countries decided in the late 1990s to allow the 
provision of VOI services. They may need to revise these decisions because the 
technology has evolved to offer quality comparable to that of traditional carriers. The 
U.S. is currently reviewing this issue because VOI carriers do not have to pay 
international settlement or local access charges or contribute to universal service 
funds that traditional carriers do. At the same time the technology is becoming more 
prevalent and quality has significantly improved. 
Because there are many factors that affect infrastructure investment, the 
empirical model takes into consideration factors such as privatization of the 
incumbent carrier, level of competition, outgoing international telecommunications 
traffic, price of international calls, and control variables such as population density 
and income per capita. 
This research is aimed at providing policy guidelines. It is timely and relevant 
because it will help regulators concerned about the regulatory implications of this 
technology for the expansion of telecommunications infrastructure. This research 
will also contribute to the academic literature on creative destruction. New 
technologies have the potential of displacing outdated ones and thus bringing with 
them numerous benefits. 
2. Understanding the problem 
The use of the Internet to make telephone calls originated in 1994 with 
computer enthusiasts who, using special software, were able to send voice messages 
(Kelly et al., 2001). The technology rapidly attracted attention more for its 
innovativeness than for its practical use. In developing countries it seemed to be 
more a curiosity than a real threat to the established traditional telecommunications 
operators. Internet telephony is a progression from the technologies that form the 
Internet. At first, making calls with computers required special software, a 
microphone, and a headset. VOI service providers now generally offer the software 
free of charge. As well, microphones are often integrated in laptop computers and 
basic headphones can be used without having echo interference from voices when 
both parties talk simultaneously. 
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In nearly ten years since the technology first emerged important 
developments have taken place. Internet telephony has been adopted differently in 
developed and less developed countries. In the developed world personal computers 
are hardly ever used to make phone calls. Young people and international students 
have used them to save money when calling family and friends. For the most part, 
the technology has aimed to optimize the traditional circuit switched networks that 
made an inefficient use of the infrastructure by having only two people use an entire 
line. Using IP packets, bandwidth is released for additional voice conversations and 
data services can also be added. 
In LDCs there have been limited efforts to upgrade infrastructure to use IP 
technology. Instead companies providing Internet telephony have perfected their 
systems to allow people to use the public Internet to make telephone calls. 
Equipment has been developed to add cards to computers so that telephone sets can 
be connected to make the calling experience more natural and similar to the 
experience of using traditional switching technology. 
Companies such as Net2Phone and Vocaltech have developed sophisticated 
packages aimed at Internet cafés, public calling centers, calling card providers, 
hotels, and marketing centers among other businesses. The solutions are intended to 
generate revenue for both the VOI facilitator and these organizations. For Internet 
cafés, for example, the marketing promotion of Net2Phone highlights the ability of 
the new equipment to generate additional revenue for the establishment because 
users who want to make calls no longer need to be tied to the computer. They can 
use the handset and then allow other users to browse the Internet while the call is 
taking place. The café can thus obtain revenue from two sources at the same time, 
effectively multiplying the use of a computer and connection to the Internet. 
Companies that offer these services advertise 90% to 95% discounts from the 
retail cost of a call through the traditional telecommunications carrier. Table 1 lists 
the prices for Net2Phone and traditional communications from a random sample of 
countries. 
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Table 1 
Price comparison of a 3 minute call to the U.S. ($US) 
Country 
Traditional 
2001* 
Extrapolated 
2003** 
Internet 
2003 
Percentage 
difference 
Hong Kong, China 2.6 2.62 0.117       2,235  
Laos P.D.R. 6.3 5.44 0.147       4,330  
Azerbaijan 7.8 7.4 0.147       4,733  
Niger 10.4 10.4 0.147       5,963  
Mali 14.6 14.6 0.147       8,352  
Paraguay 1.08 0.72 0.15         549  
Portugal 1.02 1.02 0.15         576  
Hungary 1.18 1.63 0.147         668  
Belize 2.83 2.83 0.15       1,890  
Jordan 2.67 0.46 0.147       1,820  
Source: ITU World Telecommunications Development Indicators and Net2Phone 
*Latest year available ** Calculated from previous years 
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With the release of bandwidth that is possible with this technology companies 
are able to offer competitive rates. 
2.1. The market 
In analyzing the effects of Internet Telephony on the deployment of 
telecommunications infrastructure one needs to consider countries where ICT 
infrastructure is limited. In developed countries, where teledensity is greater than 50 
lines per 100 inhabitants, there is little concern and incumbents do not consider it a 
threat. In these markets communication access is almost universal and rates are 
relatively low. Similarly the quality of the service provided through Internet 
telephony has been low enough that the price difference does not justify the 
inconvenience.  
In developing countries with limited infrastructure the situation is quite the 
reverse. There are places where people have to wait for several years before they can 
obtain a telephone line. In low income countries the average waiting time is 1.5 years 
with some countries like Kenya or Ukraine where people wait 8.1 and 7.4 years 
respectively (ITU World Telecommunications Indicators, 2002). It is thus not 
surprising that the Pakistani government made Internet telephony illegal, enforcing 
this through restrictive contracts that explicitly prohibit companies from providing 
the service. 
In LDCs we encounter two types of problems. One is that phone lines are 
widely available but income is so low that few can afford them. In many countries 
the problem is not obtaining a line but rather the funds people have to keep it. In 
these countries the problem is not the lack of infrastructure but poverty. 
Another situation is where the infrastructure does not exist and people want 
access to these services. Of the 211 countries that are listed in the ITU’s World 
Telecommunications Indicators, 103 have waiting lists. The longest list was that of 
Russia with more than 6 million people waiting for a line, followed by Syria, India, 
and Ukraine, which had between two and three million people waiting in 2000. 
Countries with waiting lists also tend to be poor, as 37% of those are in the low or 
low middle income category. When people are unable to obtain a phone line and 
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rates to call abroad are artificially high there is a strong incentive for them to try 
inexpensive alternatives. In the mid 1980s individuals filled this need by setting up 
clandestine operations that allowed people to make illegal telephone calls at a lower 
expense. Soon afterward call-back services became popular even though many 
nations prohibited them. Internet telephony is thus another alternative where, in spite 
of the inconvenience and lower quality, people are willing to use it. The alternatives 
are either not available or not affordable. This is why the technology has become 
much more popular in LDCs than in developed countries. 
2.2. Incentives for carriers 
It is not only the governments of some countries that have prohibited the use 
of the public Internet for voice. Communication carriers themselves may have 
justifiable incentives to prohibit its use. The technology can affect these carriers’ 
revenues significantly. While in the 1950s international telephone services amounted 
to only 20% of a carrier’s revenue, in 2000 this corresponded to 95% (Sharifi, 2001, 
p. 315). International incoming and outgoing telephone traffic is highly profitable, 
particularly in countries where artificially high accounting and settlement rates lead 
to substantial hard currency remittances from foreign carriers. 
Revenue from data is lower. ISP carriers that lease the infrastructure are not 
obliged to pay per minute charges to the carrier for interconnection. They also do not 
have to pay settlement rates for international traffic, as recommended by the World 
Trade Organization. This means that an ISP providing this type of service can 
generate additional revenue from voice traffic without having to pay extra to the 
carrier that leases the infrastructure to it. For people who have Internet access at 
home they can place international calls through their dial-up connection to the 
Internet paying only for a local call and the much lower rate that Internet telephony 
carriers charge, for which the telephone company does not obtain any additional 
revenue. In most countries ISPs are not obligated to contribute to universal service 
initiatives. This means that Internet telephony may have a negative effect on 
traditional carriers’ revenue. 
The scenario is different in developed than in developing countries. When 
VOI first emerged, governments had to decide if they would allow it or not. If they 
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were to do so they would need to determine if they could regulate it. In developed 
countries regulators considered that VOI had such primitive features that it could not 
considered voice telephony (McKnight and Leida, 2001, p. 213) and that it posed no 
threat to current carriers. In spite of these assertions there was concern among some 
observers about the technology. In the United States some members of Congress felt 
that diversion of traffic to the Internet and lack of contribution from ISPs could 
endanger universal service (Weinberg, 2001, p. 336). Some Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) officials recognized that the exemption could create an incentive 
to shift traffic to IP networks (Weinberg, 2001, p. 338). When the technology first 
appeared a group of operators created an association called ACTA to lobby the 
government for the regulation of Internet telephony. In spite of ACTA pressure, the 
FCC decided not to intervene. In Canada the concern was about contributions for the 
continued investment in communication networks. At the time the government 
decided not to require contributions from ISPs but left the door open for future 
consideration. 
In the European Union, the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition provided a series of guidelines to determine if Internet telephony should 
be regulated or not. The decision was to not regulate it. The main factor in the set of 
guidelines was the specification regarding quality. For a service to be regarded as 
voice telephony it had to be real time. As Internet telephony at that time experienced 
substantial delay, it did not meet this criterion. In Japan the provision of these 
services was allowed but required approval of the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunication (MPT). 
In spite of their initial opposition, carriers in developed countries determined 
that the technology had benefits and they adopted IP protocols in their traditional 
networks. The objective has been to optimize the use of these lines. 
In LDCs the situation is different. Lack of lines has made voice over the 
Internet quite attractive. In Tegucigalpa an Internet café in the main mall is even 
considered a tourist attraction because of the number of people who are waiting in 
line to make an Internet call in spite of the fact that the service is prohibited. Another 
factor contributing to the wider use of this technology are the much higher prices for 
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international calls that still exist in many of these countries. The more extensive use 
of Internet telephony together with the reduced revenue that traditional carriers are 
able to obtain from this service have prompted many carriers to adopt measures that 
block this activity. Some have lobbied governments to regulate or prohibit Internet 
telephony. Monopoly carriers are unwilling to negotiate agreements with ISPs that 
provide Internet telephony and they can also blocks ports that are used to route voice 
traffic.  
One could argue that it is foolish of these organizations to oppose the 
provision of these services considering that voice traffic is growing at a considerably 
slower rate than data traffic. Carriers in these countries do not see it this way because 
they do not experience much data traffic yet and would like to delay for as long as 
possible the reduction in their revenues resulting from lower voice traffic. 
Additionally, the existing revenues of carriers are insufficient to upgrade their 
obsolete and limited infrastructure. These companies require not only the revenues 
that they may be obtaining from artificially high rates but also direct support from 
governments, if they are still state owned, to provide more advanced communication 
services to the population. These carriers, unlike their developed world counterparts, 
do not have the resources to upgrade their infrastructure to install equipment that can 
take advantage of IP technologies. These countries see Internet telephony as a direct 
competitor and threat. We will explore below if the fears of these carriers and 
governments are justified.  
2.3 Why prohibit Internet telephony? 
The previous section described the reasons why carriers in LDCs would not 
like ISPs to offer Internet telephony. There are also legal constraints. A government, 
for example, might want a new technology to compete directly with the incumbent 
carrier as a way of introducing competition to the market and to motivate the 
traditional operator to upgrade its network. The problem is that many of these 
governments made concession agreements during the privatization process under 
which they promised companies a certain number of exclusive services to make the 
offer more attractive. They thus were able to sell the operator but are now unable to 
allow voice telephony through the Internet because this would violate the agreement 
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with the privatized operator. There are other countries, such as Costa Rica, that have 
constitutional limitations to opening markets for Internet telephony. 
3. Previous research contributions 
The main concern over the impact of Internet telephony is with the 
potentially negative impact that the technology can have on operators’ revenues, 
which are derived primarily from international traffic. This section reviews previous 
research that has analyzed the impact that technologies and political pressure from 
abroad have on international revenues. 
3.1. The impact of information technologies on international revenues 
Internet telephony is not the first technology that has posed a threat to 
revenue for carriers. There have been others such as call-back and international 
resale that were expected by many to negatively affect flows of capital for a 
country’s investment in infrastructure. 
Scholars have argued that call-back, international resale, and whipsawing2 
have put pressure on accounting rates. They expect that arbitrage opportunities 
would thus disappear (Lam, 1997; Frieden, 1998; Clark, 2001). One could thus 
expect that these services would have already reduced accounting rates to the point 
that Internet telephony should thus have no impact. This means that if there were a 
negative impact on infrastructure it would have happened in the early 1990s when 
call-back services were entering international telecommunication markets. Similarly, 
statistics from the FCC about international payments to foreign carriers indicate that 
settlement payments have been reduced from 1995 to 2001 by more than two thirds.3  
3.2. The impact of international pressure 
In 1997 there was also pressure from both the United States and the WTO to 
reduce accounting rates. The U.S. was concerned about the large payments that its 
                                                 
2 This allows a person in Zimbabwe, for example, to make an international phone call to South Africa, but make it seem like the call originated 
in the U.S. 
3 Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/socc.html, 
accessed May 4, 2003. 
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national operators were making to foreign carriers, thus leading to a large trade 
imbalance. This prompted the FCC to develop a series of benchmarks regarding the 
maximum amounts that U.S. carriers were allowed to pay foreign operators. At that 
time there was strong criticism on the part of foreign governments who complained 
to the U.S. on two grounds: that there was a lack of U.S. jurisdiction, and that such 
measures could severely cripple investment in infrastructure in poor countries. The 
FCC argued that they have the right to determine rates for their carriers under both 
domestic and international law (Cowhey, 1998, p. 905). Aware of the potential 
impact on investment, the FCC set its benchmarks for LDCs at a higher level and 
they were also given a longer time to comply (Cowhey, 1998, p. 906). The 
International Bureau of the FCC conducted a study to determine the impact of 
international settlement and network build out. It concluded that there was not a 
statistically significant relationship (Cowhey, 1998, p. 907). The imposition of 
benchmarks by the U.S. in 1997 should also have negatively affected foreign carrier 
revenues and thus investment in infrastructure. 
Pressure also came from the WTO where, in 1997, 69 countries developed 
guidelines for the liberalization of telecommunications markets. Among the series of 
commitments was the introduction of competition during a specified period. These 
measures were thus expected to reduce the trade imbalances that were generated by 
monopolized markets and artificially high international accounting rates. 
Of the studies reviewed on this subject only the FCC study mentioned by 
Cowhey (1998) provided empirical evidence. We thus cannot assert with certainty 
that these services indeed reduced international accounting rates and thus revenues 
for LDC carriers. 
3.3. The impact of the Internet on information infrastructure 
In spite of the work from scholars that theorized that call-back, resale, and 
international pressure would result in lower revenues for foreign carriers, there was 
considerable debate about the impact of Internet telephony when the technology first 
emerged in 1994 (ITU, 2001). Scholars that have written on the subject fall on both 
sides of the issue. Cawley (1997) predicted that Internet telephony does not lead to 
lower investment but instead motivates the upgrade and greater adoption of other 
 13
telecommunication technologies. Mason (1998) argued that Internet telephony 
should have no effects on accounting revenues because this technology is so inferior 
to alternative technologies that he finds it unlikely that people would prefer that 
medium over others that are more convenient and of higher quality than an Internet 
connection. He argues that phone based services such as call-back were better 
alternatives and that VOI would not have an impact on investment. Similarly the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in its report about Internet 
Telephony (2001) concluded that other technologies have already put substantial 
pressure on the revenues that operators could generate. The authors did not believe 
that VOI alone could have a great impact on investment either. 
In the United States carriers were concerned about a decline in their revenues. 
The ACTA association of carriers argued that this would lead to increased traffic on 
a network that was only designed to carry short voice conversations. In their 
lobbying efforts they stated that the upgrade of their networks to carry this amount of 
traffic would cost them millions of dollars (Moore, 1997). They wanted to be 
compensated in the form of access charges. Some scholars believe that Internet 
telephony threatens the viability of the international accounting system (McGarty 
and McKnight, 2001). 
We now know that in the U.S. the growth of the Internet led to greater 
investment in telecommunications and increased revenues. While this success story 
has been repeated in other developed countries this has not been the case in less 
developed ones. There are several factors that inhibit progress in LDCs: (1) lack of 
infrastructure to carry even basic voice; (2) low personal income, which limits the 
amount that households spend on communication services; and (3) obsolete 
communications equipment. It is thus in LDCs where Internet telephony could 
potentially have a negative impact on telecommunications investment. Previous 
technologies such as call-back may have already had a negative impact. 
Although none of the studies reviewed provide empirical evidence, the 
general consensus appears to be that Internet telephony would not have an effect on 
telecommunications infrastructure. In spite of this belief, there are approximately 40 
countries that have reported that they prohibit VOI. Most countries that forbid VOI 
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have either state monopolies or privatized enterprises with continued state 
participation. Only five of the countries that prohibit VOI have a privatized 
telecommunications carrier. Why is this? If revenues are already low as a result of 
the implementation of other technologies as well as international pressure, 
governments should not be as concerned about the impact of VOI. The purpose of 
this research is to determine if these concerns have merit by testing empirically if 
Internet telephony is inhibiting infrastructure deployment. As the technology has 
improved substantially, some now believe that regulation is necessary. Kiser and 
Collins (2003) argue that Internet telephony is now a technology that is more widely 
used and, in spite of this it still faces no regulatory burden. Operators providing 
Internet telephony are not obliged to pay settlement charges for international voice 
communication and they do not contribute to universal service funds. They thus 
suspected that regulators around the world would revisit this issue given that they 
perceive the advantage of these carriers as unfair. 
4. Hypothesis development  
The metric that is used in this study to measure telecommunications 
infrastructure is total number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, which includes 
both wired and wireless lines. 
Multiple factors affect the deployment of a telecommunications infrastructure 
and these must be considered in addition to Internet telephony. 
Scholars have identified factors within several categories. Table 1 shows 
those that have been presented by authors of other studies and how they were 
operationalized in this study. The table is divided in three categories. Their origin is 
from Bernt and Weiss (1993) who identified four categories: regulatory, 
organizational, economic, and technical. A more recent study by Mbarika et al. 
(2002) added four more categories: financial, managerial, political, and geographical. 
Table 2 includes only those categories and variables for which data is available for 
the period from 1999 to 2002. 
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Table 2 
Included Variables 
SOURCE FACTOR VARIABLE 
Economic 
Mbarika (1999) GDP GDP per capita (1995 $U.S.) 
Yatrakis (1992)  Volume of trade Trade a as percentage of GDP 
CCITT (1965,1995) as 
reported by Mbarika 
Mbarika (1999) 
Tertiary sectors 
% employment in agriculture 
% employment in 
manufacturing 
% employment in services 
ITU (1994)  Inadequate private sector involvement 
Level of Competition (Local, 
Int’l and ISPs) 1=monopoly 
2=duopoly 3=partial 
competition 4=full 
competition 
Maitland Commission (1984) 
Wellenius (1989) 
ITU (1994) 
Foreign capital Financing from abroad % GDP 
Organizational 
Wellenius (1989) 
ITU (1994) 
Ramamurti (1996) 
Ros (1999) 
Autonomy from 
government/Privatization 
 
Dummies 1=state owned, 2= 
semi-privatized, 3=privatized 
Regulatory/Policy/Political 
ITU (1994) Lack of a Universal Service Policy 
Dummies: Universal Service 
Policy 1=Yes 
Kirunda-Kkivenjinja (1995) Roads, Sewage, Water Roads (network size in km) 
ITU (2001) Bernard (1994) 
Lam (1997) Frieden (1998) 
Clark 2001). 
Call-back, international resale, 
and whipsawing 
Dummy: Call-back allowed 
by the government 1=yes 
 Internet Telephony Dummy: Internet telephony allowed by government 1=yes 
 
Based on the research that other scholars have done on Internet telephony, we 
know that there is still disagreement with respect to the effect of voice on the Internet 
on the further development of the telecommunications infrastructure. Scholars tend 
to believe that this technology should have no effect on further investment in 
infrastructure but private sector officials as well as regulators in many countries 
believe the contrary.  
This study developed hypotheses based on arguments made in the literature 
with respect to previous technology, international pressure, and economic factors. 
Scholars that have studied the effect of voice over the Internet believe that the call-
back, international resale, and whipsawing effects that emerged in the late 1980s 
would have already reduced the revenues of carriers. Even though this is likely to be 
the case, there were countries that also banned call-back and whipsawing. One could 
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thus potentially argue that in those countries revenue may not have fallen as much as 
these scholars expected. These types of services may, however, have been so 
difficult to monitor and enforce that even with government opposition, they were 
provided, thus negatively affecting revenues of carriers. This study includes dummy 
variables for both call-back services and Internet telephony. 
 
H1: After controlling for call-back, telecommunications infrastructure (teledensity) does not decrease 
as a result of Internet telephony. 
 
As outlined above, there was domestic pressure to reduce settlement rates for 
international traffic. Unfortunately there is no publicly available data about these 
rates and thus it is not possible to evaluate the impact that international pressure had 
on the costs of transborder calls, the revenues of carriers, and infrastructure 
expansion or improvement.  
 There are, however, other more subtle international factors that can equally 
affect the prices of telecommunications services and a carriers’ telecommunications 
revenue. These include the amount of trade activity, the level of employment in the 
service and manufacturing sectors, the amount of foreign capital that governments 
receive, as well as the amount in minutes of telecommunications traffic from other 
countries. The following hypothesis is based on assuming these factors as proxies for 
international pressure. 
 
H2: After controlling for the sizes of the service sector, trade, foreign aid, and international traffic, the 
presence of Internet telephony has no impact on infrastructure. 
 
The economic circumstances of a country can affect investment in 
telecommunication networks. There is a widely held belief that potentially low levels 
of demand in the poorest countries will mean that investment in these services is 
unprofitable. Under these circumstances many governments are unable to attract 
enough private sector capital. In Guatemala where a Universal Service fund was 
established, the organization responsible for the disbursement of subsidies was 
unable to attract any providers of services. Because this was a competitive process 
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no company was willing to do the market research and then fail to obtain the subsidy 
during the bidding process. 
Lack of income influences both private and public sector decisions. Without 
this type of information investors will be unwilling to take risks. Taking into 
consideration that economic factors play a role in a company’s willingness to invest 
we would expect: 
 
H3: After controlling for the income level of the population, Internet telephony has no impact on the 
telecommunications infrastructure of a country. 
5. Data analysis 
This section examines the impact that technological, regulatory, and 
economic factors have on the deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. The 
first part presents descriptive statistics to help understand the general circumstances 
of the market, the carriers, and the regulatory restrictions that were put on these 
technologies. It will help identify the countries where call-back was available. It also 
identifies the market conditions of those countries with respect to the ownership 
status of the main telecommunications operator as well as the level of competition to 
determine if these factors were related to the decision to allow or prohibit the use of 
technologies such as call-back and Internet telephony. The second part presents a 
regression analysis of the variables of interest. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Technologies are likely to have different effects on countries depending on 
level of income. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for each of the factors included 
in the statistical analysis by level of income. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics: means 
Variable Low income Medium low income 
Medium high 
income High income 
Telecom 
revenue 58,016,035 166,575,630 566,881,021 1,557,223,088 
GDP per capita 379 1,409 4,782 19,437 
Trade 68 90 93 105 
Employment in 
services 46 54 55 63 
Employment in 
agriculture 43 26 15 5 
Employment in 
industry 16 22 26 27 
Financing from 
abroad 2.8 2.2 2.0 1.9 
International 
incoming 
telephone traffic 
28,234,918 75,575,295 142,508,186 338,407,044 
Cost of 3 min 
call to USA 4.45 5.3 3.82 5.44 
Population 9,480,238 4,143,411 4,095,379 2,995,644 
Number of 
countries 61 50 33 43 
 
We can see from this table that higher income economies also have higher 
levels of trade, greater levels of service and industry workforce, and a smaller 
agricultural sector. There is more traffic flowing into higher income countries and a 
call to the U.S. is cheaper as income increases. 
Scholars have argued that technologies such as call-back, which came before 
Internet telephony, had a negative impact on the revenues of the telecommunications 
operators. In 1999 and 2000 the ITU asked telecommunications regulators if they 
allowed or prohibited call-back services. This information is summarized in Tables 5 
and 5. The majority of countries did not allow it. Call-back was less likely to affect 
the revenue of operators in places where it was not permitted. The large number of 
countries that did not allow call-back services in 2000 is surprising considering that 
carriers had many years to lower prices to meet this competition. It is also surprising 
because in 2000 many countries had already privatized and liberalized their 
telecommunications industry and thus imposing restrictions on these services would 
not reduce rates. Restrictions on call-back services and subsequently on Internet 
telephony may have been related to the terms of privatization that were granted to 
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the company. In many of these cases private operators were given several years of 
monopoly status. Tables 4 and 5 present the percentage of countries that prohibited 
call-back services and compares these based on the ownership of the incumbent and 
the level of competition. Table 4 shows that in those countries where the market is 
monopolized 69.5% of regulators did not allow call-back services while 67.4% of 
countries that experienced either full or partial competition permitted call-back 
services. Similarly in 54.3% of the countries that did not allow call-back, the 
telecommunications operator remained under state ownership while 84% of those 
countries that allowed the services where either privatized or partially privatized. 
This could be an indication of government concerns about having a decline in 
international revenues as a result of this service. It could also be an indication of the 
concession agreements that were done when privatization took place. 
Tables 4 and 5 
Percentage of countries that allow call-back services according to the ownership of the incumbent and 
level of local competition 
 Call-back   Call-back 
 Not 
allowed Allowed 
 
 Not allowed Allowed 
Monopoly 69.5 30.2  State owned 54.3 16.3 
Duopoly 5.5 2.3  Privatized 5.4 32.6 
Partial 
competition 10.2 55.8 
 
Partially privatized 40.3 51.2 
Competition 14.1 11.6     
N = 172    N = 171   
Pearson chi2(4) =  40.5013   Pr = 0.000     Pearson chi2(2) =  30.7213   Pr = 0.000 
  
 
Table 9 lists the countries that prohibit Internet telephony by income level. 
Countries of the European Union are not included in this table because of a directive 
that permits the service because it does not meet the standards of voice telephony. 
Tables 6 and 7 present the percentage of countries that prohibited this service 
according to the level of competition and the ownership of the incumbent. The 
results are similar to those of call-back services. 78% of the countries that decided to 
prohibit Internet telephony also have monopolized markets and the carriers are state 
owned. In contrast, 73.5% of the countries that allowed these services also 
experience either full or partial competition. Similarly, 53% of countries where 
Internet telephony was banned still maintained a state carrier under state ownership 
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while of those countries where the service was allowed 73% had been privatized or 
partially privatized. In both cases the χ2 is significant. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 
Percentage of countries that allow Internet telephony services according to the ownership of the 
incumbent and level of local competition 
 Internet Telephony   Internet Telephony 
 Prohibited Allowed   Prohibited Allowed 
Monopoly 78.18 26.53  State owned 52.73 26.53 
Competition 5.45 48.98  Privatized 7.27 22.45 
Partial competition 16.36 24.49  
Partially 
privatized 40 51.02 
N = 104    N = 104   
Pearson chi2(2) =  32.5957   Pr = 0.000 Pearson chi2(2) =   9.2380   Pr = 0.010 
 
Table 9 
Countries that prohibited Internet telephony services by income level (2000) 
Low income 
countries 
Lower middle income 
countries 
Upper-middle income 
countries High income countries 
Eritrea 
Liberia 
Kenya 
Ethiopia 
Benin 
Nigeria 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Senegal 
Mozambique 
Guinea 
Cameroon 
Central African Rep. 
Nicaragua 
Azerbaijan 
Armenia 
Nepal 
Myanmar 
Indonesia 
India 
Mongolia 
Cambodia 
Pakistan 
Comoros 
Yemen 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
Belize 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Romania 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Albania 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Jordan 
Syria 
Morocco 
Botswana 
Gabon 
Seychelles 
Argentina 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Panama 
Turkey 
Croatia 
Estonia 
Cyprus 
Israel 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
Total = 24 Total = 17 Total = 9 Total = 4 
Source: Telecommunications Regulation Database, ITU 2002 
Table 8 
Countries that prohibited call-back services by income level (2000) 
Low income countries Lower middle income countries Upper-middle income countries High income countries 
Haiti 
Georgia  
Moldova 
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Uzbekistan 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Ukraine 
Indonesia 
Nepal 
Lao P.D.R. 
Viet Nam 
Mongolia 
India 
Bangladesh 
Afghanistan 
Cambodia 
Pakistan 
Myanmar 
Comoros 
Yemen 
Sudan 
Mauritania 
Eritrea 
Cameroon 
Burundi 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Senegal 
Benin 
Congo 
Chad 
Zambia 
Mozambique 
Central African Rep. 
Congo (Democratic 
Republic) 
Uganda 
Guinea 
Tanzania 
Ghana 
Gambia 
Niger 
Malawi 
Kenya 
Sierra Leone 
Nigeria 
Zimbabwe 
Ethiopia 
Rwanda 
Mali 
Madagascar 
Cape Verde 
Swaziland 
Equatorial Guinea 
Jamaica 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Belize 
Honduras 
Bolivia 
Suriname 
Peru 
Cuba 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
T.F.Y.R. Macedonia 
Lithuania 
Kazakhstan 
Bulgaria 
Latvia 
Belarus 
Romania 
Albania 
 
 
Fiji 
China 
Maldives 
Tonga 
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Marshall Islands 
Jordan 
Morocco 
Syria 
Egypt 
Tunisia 
Algeria 
Djibouti 
Mauritius 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
Gabon 
Botswana 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Dominica 
Uruguay 
Mexico 
Panama 
Grenada 
Costa Rica 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Hungary 
Croatia 
Slovak Republic 
Turkey 
Czech Republic 
Poland 
Malaysia 
Oman 
Saudi Arabia 
Libya 
Bahrain 
Lebanon 
Bahamas 
Slovenia 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Malta 
Israel 
Brunei Darussalam 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
United Arab Emirates 
Total = 52 Total = 38 Total = 26 Total = 10 
One of the main obstacles in doing empirical international research is in many cases the lack of complete data. This study is not the 
exception. Although institutions like the World Bank, the ITU, and the IMF collect statistics from more than 200 countries, much of 
the information is missing. It has been well documented in the statistics field that doing analysis of only those cases that have 
complete data can lead to biased results. In this study the initial number of countries was 213. The list was reduced to 188 because 
many of those countries had data on only two or three of the variables that were included in the analysis. The number of countries 
eliminated should not cause bias in these results because they are either very small economies or are going through major transitions. 
Examples of countries that were eliminated include Afghanistan, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Iraq, Mayotte, and Andorra. This does not 
mean that there was complete data for the rest of them. There were some variables for which many data points were missing. Table 10 
presents the list of variables and the number of observations that were available. The total number of observations was thus 1128 
because data was collected for 6 years for each of these countries. 
Table 10 
Percentage of missing data per variable 
Variable No. of  complete observations % Missing 
GDP per capita 1041 8% 
Trade 979 13% 
Employment in services 394 65% 
Employment in agriculture 414 63% 
Employment in industry 416 63% 
Competition in international telecom service 916 19% 
Intlfinance 488 57% 
Number of Faults 666 41% 
Privatizatization 885 22% 
Universal Service Program 621 45% 
Roads 889 21% 
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VOI regulation 617 45% 
Level of ISP competition 258 77% 
Call-back regulation 987 13% 
Telecommunication revenue 1037 8% 
Incoming international traffic 913 19% 
Outgoing international traffic 1070 5% 
Price of a 3 min call to the U.S. 772 32% 
Teledensity 1116 1% 
Population 1100 2% 
  
While the models could not have included all the variables there would have been some for which less than 300 observations 
would have been included. Because missing variables is a common problem, scholars have devised techniques to calculate the missing 
variables from existing ones. Some methods that have been found to be inadequate (Little & Rubin, 1987; Graham, Hofer & Piccinin, 
1994) include ad hoc ones, such as using the mean from the observed values, extrapolating from the latest value available, also known 
as last-observation-carried-forward (LOCF), and the use of regression analysis to estimate values. For this study these were 
particularly inappropriate because for some variables there was missing data for two or three consecutive years. This meant that the 
same value would have been given for the three years in the case of any of the ad hoc or regression methods. The approach used in 
this project was that of multiple imputation where missing data is generated simultaneously from all the available variables for all the 
observations and years. The mathematical algorithms that are necessary for multiple imputation are now easier to use thanks to 
advances in computing. In this project I used the Amelia program developed by Honaker, Joseph, and King (2000). 
Infrastructure is measured by the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Table 11 presents the results per income level 
of the countries in the regression analysis. It uses a fixed effects model that includes the year dummies to capture the changes in 
infrastructure deployment. The fixed model was selected because of the recognition that the way technology affects each country will 
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depend on its specific circumstances. We are thus interested in the differences within each country and how these technologies affect 
the deployment of infrastructure. The analysis used the following model. 
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Table 11 
Effect of market, organizational, and regulatory conditions on telecommunications infrastructure as measured by teledensity 
Teledensity All countries Low income Low middle income 
Upper middle 
income High income 
Telecom revenue 1.046* 0.948 1.033 1.012 1.099 
GDP per capita 1.328*** 1.613*** 0.949 1.094 1.132** 
Trade  -0.001** -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 -0.002*** 
Employment in 
services  -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
Employment in 
industry  0.007*** 0.010*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.002 
International Long 
distance competition 0.028 0.069 0.097** 0.052 -0.026 
Financing from 
abroad 1.026* 1.051 0.995 1.043*** 1.006*** 
International 
incoming telephone 
traffic 1.162*** 1.182*** 1.115*** 1.194 1.155 
Cost of 3 min call to 
USA 1.006 1.001 0.997 0.984 0.992 
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Ln Population 0.897*** 1.199 5.812*** 0.801*** 0.835*** 
Incumbent privatized 0.062* 0.116* 0.058* 0.017 0.006 
Universal Service 
Fund 0.041* -0.038 0.005 0.069** 0.057 
Internet Telephony 
Policy -0.018 0.031 -0.057 -0.026 -0.112** 
Call-back policy 0.065 0.152 0.035 -0.084 0.102* 
Year 96 0.075*** 0.056 0.079** 0.097*** 0.055 
Year 97 0.157*** 0.125* 0.174*** 0.229*** 0.110** 
Year 98 0.253*** 0.162* 0.237*** 0.363*** 0.243*** 
Year 99 0.383*** 0.224** 0.337*** 0.523*** 0.434*** 
Year 00 0.535*** 0.340*** 0.491*** 0.720*** 0.598*** 
_cons -2.132*** -7.486 -27.225*** 1.806 0.839 
N 1128 366 300 198 258 
Within R-sq 0.62 0.55 0.74 0.89 0.69 
*Significant at .10 ** Significant at .05 
 
One interesting finding is the way economic factors affect countries in the four income levels. The richer the country is the less 
that economic factors matter. Telecommunications revenues do not seem to have much effect on infrastructure. For high income and 
lower middle income countries revenues were non-significant at the 10% level but significant at higher levels. This means that 
revenues are invested in infrastructure in some countries. GDP per capita is a significant variable and, as expected, higher incomes 
have a positive effect on infrastructure. Dividing the countries by income levels makes this factor non-significant because there is little 
variability among them. Employment in industry has a positive impact on teledensity. As stated above, scholars have found a positive 
relationship between the service economy and teledensity. Employment in services is not significant with the exception of low income 
countries. All other income levels were significant at a lower confidence level of 15%.  
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Having large incoming international traffic also positively affects the deployment of infrastructure. This is truer in lower 
income countries where it is clear that hard currency revenue has an impact. Higher income countries generally originate more 
international calls than they receive. Having a privatized carrier also has a positive impact on a country’s telecom infrastructure 
particularly in lower income countries, where privatizations have been shown to have a positive effect. With respect to the variables of 
interest in this research, specifically call-back and Internet telephony, neither was significant. This means that they do not have either 
a positive or a negative effect on the telecom infrastructure of a country. 
The variable corresponding to the level of competition is significant only for low middle income countries. This indicates that 
competition has a positive effect on infrastructure. Because developing countries have liberalized their markets more slowly than rich 
economies, the effects of competition are being felt as they have increased teledensity over the years of the study. In many high 
income countries, however, competition was introduced earlier and teledensity is quite high. Thus, any additional competition may 
have an effect on prices but not necessarily on the further development of basic telecommunications infrastructure. 
The amount of finance received from abroad appears to have an effect in upper income countries only. It is possible that 
financing from abroad is not used for telecommunication infrastructure projects in the lowest income countries. 
The price of a three minute call to the U.S. does not seem to have any effect on infrastructure. In this model universal service 
was coded as one if the country had a universal service fund and zero if it did not. Universal service funds are still relatively new and 
thus there are only a few countries that have adopted them. The variable is significant for upper middle income countries, which are 
also those that have more broadly adopted these programs. 
The two variables of greatest interest in this study are call-back and Internet telephony. Neither is significant for all countries 
except the higher income ones. It is not surprising that call-back has no effect as the technology is no longer new and any negative 
effects would have been felt in the years before the ones included here. The effects of Internet telephony nonetheless should have been 
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felt in the years of the study because the technology was first implemented in the mid-1990s. It is interesting to see how the effect of 
Internet telephony is negative while the effect of call-back is positive in high income countries. The negative effect of Internet 
telephony is not surprising and could be related to the use of these technologies by people who want to call their home countries 
without using traditional carriers, which have to pay high settlement charges. Call-back services were favorable to countries such as 
the U.S. that have lower settlement rates. This thus led to people in high rate countries to use these services, which generated greater 
traffic for carriers that offered lower rates. 
The fact that the coefficient is not significant also does not suggest that it has a positive effect. This is important because some 
people argue that allowing these technologies in the market will force the incumbent carrier to become more efficient because it is a 
form of competition. If this had been the case then the coefficient would have been significant with a positive sign. The most likely 
event is that the level of use is too low to have any impact on infrastructure. 
Both call-back services and Internet telephony are expected to have a negative impact on the revenues of carriers. This is 
represented in the model below. Table 12 shows the regression results for that variable. It is also organized by income level. 
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Table 12 
Effect of market, organizational, and regulatory conditions on telecommunications revenue 
Telecommunications 
Revenue All countries Low income 
Low middle 
income 
Upper middle 
income High income 
GDP per capita 2.260*** 2.703*** 0.725 3.025*** 2.078*** 
International Long 
distance competition 0.052 0.144 -0.024 0.044 0.017 
Financing from 
abroad 0.970* 0.939** 0.946 0.970 0.988 
International 
incoming telephone 
traffic 1.327*** 1.232*** 1.376*** 1.368*** 1.234*** 
Cost of 3 min call to 
USA 1.001 0.997 1.010 1.010 0.985 
Ln Population 1.744*** 0.832 0.556 1.677*** 1.829*** 
Privatized carrier 0.016 -0.083 0.132 -0.058 0.011 
Universal Service 
Fund -0.027 -0.130** 0.071 0.017 -0.037 
Internet Telephony 
Policy 0.047 0.046 0.086 -0.027 0.023 
Call-back policy 0.110* -0.091 -0.151 -0.047 0.322*** 
Year 96 0.046** 0.058 0.102 0.100 0.024 
Year 97 0.033** 0.053 0.089 0.090 0.088 
Year 98 0.083* 0.137 0.140 0.219*** 0.091 
Year 99 0.081* 0.002 0.202* 0.257*** 0.198*** 
Year 00 0.096* 0.134 0.244* 0.287*** 0.103 
_cons -0.809 11.425 24.343 -3.074 0.628 
N 1128 366 300 198 258 
Within R2 0.57 0.74 0.22 0.50 0.75 
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*Significant at .10 ** Significant at .05 
 
The revenue of carriers seems to be affected only by the amount of traffic that goes through the network and the income level 
of the population. The implementation of universal service policies does not seem to have an effect on revenues. When it does, as is 
the case in low income countries, the impact is negative. The level of revenues from one year to the next seems to vary as some are 
able to predict revenue for that year and some are not. This may be a reflection of the volatility of the industry after privatization and 
liberalization. The two important variables for this study, call-back and Internet telephony, are not significant either except for high 
income countries where this technology appears to have a positive effect. These two technologies may be used at such low levels 
compared to the use of traditional communications that it simply has not had an impact on these carriers’ revenues.  
The final model used in this analysis is a simultaneous equation estimation. This was necessary because the impact that any of 
these technologies can have on infrastructure is related to how they affect revenues. Thus I used a two stage least square procedure for 
panel data. 
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Table 13 
Simultaneous equation model of the effects of market, organizational, and regulatory conditions on 
telecommunications infrastructure with telecom revenue as a nested equation 
Teledensity All countries Low income Low middle income 
Upper middle 
income High income 
Telecom revenue 1.888*** 1.596*** 1.471*** 1.181** 1.389*** 
Trade 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002*** 
Employment in 
services 0.000 -0.002 0.003** 0.000 -0.001 
Employment in 
industry 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.002 
Financing from abroad1.044*** 1.065* 1.016 1.044*** 1.004 
Ln Population 0.583*** 1.554 7.079*** 0.765*** 0.764*** 
Universal Service 
Fund 0.048 0.028 -0.008 0.079*** 0.067* 
Internet Telephony 
Policy -0.083** 0.011 -0.091** -0.036 -0.108* 
Call-back policy -0.045 0.195 0.072 -0.060 0.044 
Year 96 0.036 0.033 0.046 0.103*** 0.053 
Year 97 0.117*** 0.100 0.148*** 0.243*** 0.099** 
Year 98 0.195*** 0.140 0.201*** 0.374*** 0.231*** 
Year 99 0.309*** 0.260** 0.287*** 0.541*** 0.404*** 
Year 00 0.435*** 0.311** 0.433*** 0.756*** 0.616*** 
_cons -2.014*** -15.440 -35.394*** 3.388 1.190 
Obs 1128 366 300 198 258 
R-sqr 0.45 0.41 0.56 0.87 0.66 
*Significant at .10 ** Significant at .05 
 
 31
The results of this last model are similar to those obtained in the separate models. Call-back is not significant and Internet 
telephony when allowed appear to have an negative impact on infrastructure for high and low middle income countries but the impact 
is too small to be of concern to governments. Infrastructure increases every year and all of the coefficients are significant. If any of the 
two technologies had had a negative impact it would have showed some reduction or perhaps even a negative number. 
There were several problems that needed to be overcome in this research. Heteroskedasticity was present, although the model 
was corrected by the use of a robust regression. Similarly multicollinearity problems were solved by corrections in the model and the 
elimination of variables because the original design was overspecified. Although the problem of missing data was solved by the use of 
multiple imputation techniques, the resulting numbers can still result in inaccuracies, even though this method is the best available in 
statistical research. The results, although consistent with previous research, should be taken with caution. 
 
6. Implications and conclusions 
 
Governments are challenged when new technologies emerge. They are problematic because in many cases these innovations 
do not fit within the existing policy or regulatory frameworks. Call-back services in the 1980s and Internet telephony in the 1990s are 
two examples of the many technologies that have had an affect on policy. More recently digital trunking challenged regulators on 
spectrum allocation. Regulators will face a similar challenge when wireless fidelity (WiFi) becomes more prevalent. In these cases 
there are concerns about the impact on existing companies and on the regulators themselves, as they do not know how to regulate 
these new technologies, particularly when existing policies may be difficult to change. There are also cases where the regulator may 
be sympathetic to the new technology but is pressured by companies to prevent its introduction. In the telecommunications sector this 
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has been a natural response. Many of these companies have had monopolized markets for many years. They benefited from an 
unchallenged inflow of revenues and, because of their highly regulated status, they learned to operate and relate to regulators. In a 
situation where their traditional business models are being threatened, the natural response is to impede change. 
Regulators should, however, be concerned about frequently changing policies because laws and regulations are the basis for 
functioning markets and thus they cannot be changed at will. There are contracts and commitments in place that may prevent 
regulators from changing policy. In many cases, nonetheless, there simply is no framework that accommodates these new 
technologies. When a regulator decides to change a rule to accommodate innovation, it may be flooded with lawsuits. 
What approach, then, should regulators take? For developing countries the results of this analysis show that at least two 
technologies, call-back and Internet telephony, have not had negative impact on infrastructure. This shows that the effect that these 
technologies may have on the existing carriers is, if anything, gradual. It would thus be premature to impede innovation, particularly 
when benefits to the public are clear. Operators are aware of these technologies and the gradual improvement of these new services 
should give them time to respond in a manner that strengthens their competitive position. Regulators should thus approach the matter 
cautiously, simply observing the evolution of the technology as it affects the market and making agreements with operators to review 
policies within specific periods. If there are signs of a negative impact policies could be revised. Regulators should be prepared to 
answer carrier’s challenges. They may simply follow the current law, which is often broad enough to embrace new technologies. 
Banning the technologies without evidence of negative effects on society, as opposed to carriers alone, can prevent these countries 
from incorporating services that would benefit the public. 
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